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A CASE STUDY ON THE IMPACTS OF COST ESTIMATING 
WITHIN ACQUISITION PROGRAM DECISION-MAKING 
ABSTRACT 
The use of cost estimating is critical to the continuation of acquisition programs 
due to full funding requirements. Cost estimates are developed and updated throughout 
the acquisition life cycle of nearly every defense acquisition program. This project 
analyzes all methods used by the Department of Defense for cost estimating and the 
trade-offs associated with each method. Understanding these methodologies, a real-life 
case study is developed based on the Joint Common Missile program and its cost 
estimates in order to facilitate the ability of acquisition professionals to analyze various 
cost estimates and understand the associated risks of cost estimating in order to make 
more prudent decisions or recommendations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This project is designed to produce an active learning environment through a case 
study to increase the capability of acquisition professionals, teachers, and students alike 
regarding cost estimating and the decision-making that cost estimates (CE) influence. The 
use of a case study allows for students and teachers to conduct social engagement that 
strengthens learning outcomes, increases individual performance, and amplifies emotional 
engagement relating to the effects of cost estimating (Nkhoma et al., 2017). The Joint 
Common Missile (JCM) is the program of record that is used for the case study due to the 
variance of its joint cost position (JCP) and the JCM independent cost estimate (ICE) 
produced by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG). Both estimates were 
developed in preparation for the JCM’s Milestone (MS) B Review with variances in 
schedules, technology maturation, and learning and production rate effects. Understanding 
these variances and their impacts on future costs is critical to the decision-making process 
used by a program manager (PM). 
A. AFFORDABILITY DETERMINED THROUGH COST ESTIMATING 
Affordability is always a major factor for procurement and in any defense 
acquisition program. Nearly all programs procured with taxpayer dollars for use within the 
Department of Defense (DOD) are constrained by budgeted dollars. Complicating things 
more are the “colors” of appropriated money. Given the complexity of defense acquisitions 
and their linkage to federal appropriations, program costs are heavily scrutinized 
throughout the entirety of the acquisition life cycle. Helping to reduce the complexity of 
the acquisition life cycle, CEs aid in decision-making along a program’s timeline 
depending on the acquisition category (ACAT) of each program. Programs below the 
simplified acquisition threshold (SAT) are not required to produce CEs but often produce 
them to assist in decision-making. 
According to Mislick and Nussbaum, CEs are a prediction of what the cost of future 
events will or should be. Cost estimating is the process of forecasting a future result in 
terms of cost and based upon information available at the time the estimate is made 
2 
(Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). Cost estimates assist stakeholders with dollar-driven data 
needed to make timely and accurate decisions (R. Mortlock, PowerPoint slides, September 
2019). CEs are typically needed at program initiation and all subsequent milestones, 
including the full rate production decision review (FRP DR; Parker, 2011). There are four 
methods that the DOD uses to develop cost estimates: analogy (top down), parametric 
(statistical), engineering (bottom up), and actual (extrapolation). Sometimes, due to lack of 
data or experience, expert opinion is also used as a method for cost estimating. It is 
important to note that most CEs are a composition of more than one method (Department 
of Defense [DOD], 2018a). 
B. PROJECT ORGANIZATION 
This project is built to allow the reader to understand the program of record being 
used and the basics of cost estimating. Background information on the JCM program as it 
relates to a hardware acquisition program traversing the Defense Acquisition System 
rounds the reader in the context of the case study. Additionally, cost estimating and its 
methods are reviewed as part of the acquisition life cycle. There is a literature review 
conducted on the importance of teaching through case study and the importance cost 
estimating has on the milestone decision reviews and program continuation/affordability 
decisions. The case study itself presents a scenario of an assistant program manager (APM) 
presented with multiple CEs that vary significantly in some areas but are relatively similar 
in total cost. Students must be capable of understanding the data within CEs to derive the 
inherent risks associated with the respective CEs. The ability for students to properly 
understand the risks associated with cost estimating is critical to the learning outcomes 
expressed through the discussion questions provided. Ultimately, with the appropriate data 
and background information, students will develop recommendations for the JCM PM as 
it relates to the CEs. Suggestions for this case study’s teaching methodology are provided 
to support the format of the case study. 
3 
II. BACKGROUND 
According to the JCM Acquisition Strategy Report (R. Mortlock, email to author, 
January 9, 2020), there became a growing need within the DOD to replace not only the 
depleted stocks of the Hellfire missile, but also the Hellfire missile itself, the tube-
launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile, and Maverick missile systems 
with just one missile system. Replacement of these missile variants meant integration of 
three types of seeker technologies and advancement of current missile technologies relating 
to propulsion as well as warhead capability. By integrating multiple technologies into one 
missile, the U.S. Army (USA) rotary-wing aircraft, the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine 
Corps (USMC) rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and United Kingdom (UK) rotary-winged 
aircraft could execute a numerous and various array of missions with one common 
missile—the JCM (R. Mortlock, email to author, January 9, 2020). 
A. THE JOINT COMMON MISSILE PROGRAM 
The abundance of anti-tank missiles within the defense department was recognized 
at the congressional level in the late 1990s (CM PO, 2003). In response, the Program 
Executive Office Tactical Missiles (PEO TM) initiated and developed a business plan to 
address the congressional concerns. It was within this business plan that the PEO TM 
sought to bring the multiple seeker technologies into one delivery device, therefore 
reducing the amount of anti-tank missiles within the defense department’s arsenal 




Figure 1. Anti-Tank Missiles Potentially Replaced by JCM. Adapted from 
R. Mortlock (personal communication, January 9, 2020).  
1. JCM Program within the Acquisition Environment 
According to the article, The Joint Common Missile Project: Program Management 
Lessons Learned (Mortlock, 2005), the JCM project office (PO) was established in October 
2001 under the provisions of the streamlined acquisition principles, allowing the program 
to be tailored and therefore bypass or rapidly complete the Materiel Solution Analysis 
(MSA) phase due to independent yet mature technologies. The program’s initial planned 
timeline brought the JCM to MS B in April 2004, a little more than two years after the 
PO’s establishment. The acquisition environment and the decision support systems that 
guide acquisition programs through completion are depicted in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. New DOD Acquisition Environment with the Addition of the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System. Adapted from 
Defense Acquisition University (2013). 
Shortly after its establishment, the JCM program was selected to become the first-
ever program to traverse the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) process, which served as the JCM’s genesis for key program documentation. 
Figure 3 depicts the JCIDS process by which appropriate requirements develop into three 
types of programs: “risk OK” circumscribes that no materiel solution will support the 
requirement submitted; “change in Doctrine, Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership 
and education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTmLPF)” recommends a non-materiel change 
to the DOD to support the capability needed; and “gap validated,” which leads to a materiel 
solution, or in this case, the JCM program (Rausch, 2019). For JCM, the requirement called 
for a multimodal, precision-guided air-to-ground missile with a multipurpose warhead and 
common motor to be fired from both rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft. Only a materiel 
solution through a development effort could meet this requirement, which resulted in an 
initial capabilities document (ICD), which was approved by the Joint Requirements 




Figure 3. JCIDS Process. Source: Rausch (2019). 
At the materiel development decision (MDD), the JCM program milestone decision 
authority (MDA) determined that the JCM should become a program of record and 
officially enter the acquisition framework at the MS B. This decision was based on the 
urgency of need, available resources, and technology maturity level of critical missile 
components (Mortlock, 2005). The JCM program had just finished a very successful three-
year Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase, which met all exit criteria 
in which all critical technology elements (CTE) were assessed at technology readiness level 
(TRL) 6. Successful science and technology objectives (STO) efforts by Research, 
Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) preceded the TMRR phase. 
Comprehensive analysis during the TMRR phase underpinned the requirements for the 
JCM program. 
Using Figure 4 to show the critical steps for the JCM program with respect to the 
capabilities requirements process, it is operating within the blue box and hopefully 
transitioning to EMD following a successful MS B DAB. The capabilities-based 
7 
assessment (CBA) documented the need for JCM, along with an approved ICD. An 
approved analysis of alternatives (AoA) solidified the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC)-approved capability development document (CDD) requirements, 
including the key performance parameter (KPP) thresholds/objectives. 
 
Figure 4. Capabilities Requirements Process. Source: Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 
(OUSD[A&S], 2020). 
The second realm of decision support systems for defense acquisition represented 
in Figure 2 is the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). Here, the decision authorities vary 
depending on the acquisition category (ACAT) of the program. Due to the JCM being an 
ACAT ID (D refers to the defense acquisition board that advises the milestone decision 
authority [MDA]), the MDA for the JCM was the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]). 
Shown in Figure 5, the JCM program would operate within the hardware-centric 
acquisition framework. As the JCM PO established post-MS A and the CDD was validated 
through the JCIDS process, MS B became the next major decision point for the program. 
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In order to reduce risk in the TMRR phase, the PO emphasized that current technologies 
should focus on simulation and modeling (S&M). This deliberate process was critical to 
the program’s ability to mitigate risk as it transitioned from numerous independent 
technologies into one system during Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD). 
 
Figure 5. Defense Acquisition Program Model for a Hardware-Centric 
Acquisition Such as the JCM. Source: OUSD(A&S) (2020). 
A benefit of the JCM program establishing post-MS A was the PEO TM’s ability 
to leverage its already successful business plan ventures that supported the JCM program 
and the PEO TM. In doing so, the JCM program timeline depicted in Figure 6 represents a 
program that successfully negotiated a TMRR phase with a planned four-year EMD phase. 
In doing so, it also completed all JCIDS and JROC requirements and was postured for its 
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) with the MDA at MS B. 
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Figure 6. JCM Program Schedule. Source: R. Mortlock (personal 
communication, January 9, 2020). 
The third and final realm of the decision support systems represented in Figure 2 is 
the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. The purpose of the 
PPBE process is to ensure that resources are properly allocated within the DOD to support 
the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Security Strategy (NSS) objectives. 
Even though broken down into four distinct phases, each phase is not mutually exclusive. 
It is within the PPBE process that all acquisition professionals rely heavily on cost 
estimates to inform decision-making and recommendations. Affordability becomes a 
central theme at every major decision point. Figure 7 represents where cost estimates are 
required for ACAT ID programs in order to inform decision-makers on future costs. 
10 
 
Figure 7. Cost Estimates Required along a Defense Acquisition Program 
Timeline. Adapted from Parker (2011). 
Specifically, for the JCM program referenced in Figure 7, there are numerous cost-
estimating requirements as the JCM program traverses the acquisition framework. The 
Program Office Estimate (POE), Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD), 
Component Cost Estimate (CCE), and ICE are all required for the defense acquisition 
board at MS B. The draft CARD developed for the JCM program was based on a notional 
design due to the program not having a specific contractor design. The CARD prepared for 
the JCM program was approved during the Cost Analysis Brief (CAB) and would influence 
the JCP and the ICE developed by the CAIG (R. Mortlock, email to author, November 14, 
2019). 
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Further clarification from the JCM Acquisition Strategy Report (R. Mortlock, email 
to author, January 9, 2020) shows the genesis of the program’s start post-Congressional 
concerns that sought a reduction in anti-tank missiles. The growing need by the services to 
upgrade existing air-to-ground missiles guided the Army, Navy, and Marines toward a 
common solution. Led by the Army, the JCM became the solution to both the need and 
subsequent requirements. During the TMRR phase of the defense acquisition framework, 
the JCM PO focused on the JCM’s ability to incorporate independently mature 
technologies into one single system, as shown in Figure 8. It is with these collective 
technologies that the program faced dramatically different cost estimates to inform 
decision-making heading into the EMD phase. At the onset of MS B, a prototype of the 
JCM had yet to be flown (R. Mortlock, email to author, January 9, 2020). 
 
Figure 8. Independent Technology Integrated into the JCM. Source: 
Mortlock (2005). 
2. JCM Joint Cost Position 
According to the Cost Review Board Working Group (CRBWG), the JCM JCP was 
developed in preparation for MS B and later became the CE used by the defense acquisition 
executive (DAE) for the program entering into EMD (R. Mortlock, email to author, 
November 14, 2019). The JCP was a combination of updated POEs by both the Army and 
12 
Navy that was reconciled through the CRBWG. It combined the cost estimates of the 
Army’s portion of the missile (all common components) and the Navy and Marine’s CE 
relating to the Navy/Marine-specific components of the JCM. The JCP also served to 
document the methodologies used throughout the CE. In the case of the JCP, it utilized 
multiple CE methodologies, including analogy, parametric, engineering, and actuals, as 
well as expert opinion. The CRBWG developed the JCP from January 12–30, 2004, and 
used the approved original “notional” CARD. The estimated costs developed in the JCP 
broken down by “colors” of money is found in Table 1 (R. Mortlock, email to author, 
November 14, 2019). 
Table 1. JCP JCM Life-Cycle Costs. Source: R. Mortlock (personal 
communication, November 14, 2019). 
Cost Element JCP  Army Navy Total 
1.0 RDT&E 552 418 970 
2.0 Procurement 2,162 3,861 6,023 
4.0 Military Personnel 15 - 15 
5.0 Operations and Maintenance 179 88 267 
 Total Life Cycle Costs 2,908 4,367 7,275 
This table uses Budget Year (BY) 2004 dollars in millions. 
 
3. Cost Analysis Improvement Group Independent Cost Estimate for the 
JCM 
Due to the statutory requirements outlined in Figure 7, the JCM program was 
required to produce an ICE in addition to the JCP. The CAIG ICE produced for the JCM 
program varied somewhat with the JCP. The CAIG’S ICE for the JCP is based on the 
updated CARD, dated March 23, 2004, roughly two months after the JCP was complete. 
The ICE and JCP variance of life-cycle costs are depicted in Table 2 (R. Mortlock, email 
to author, November 14, 2019). 
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Table 2. JCM ICE and JCP Life-Cycle Cost Comparison. Adapted from R. 
Mortlock (personal communication, November 14, 2019). 
Cost Element Cost Estimate Source Difference JCP CAIG 
1.0 RDT&E 970 1,350 380 
2.0 Procurement 6,023 7,490 1,467 
4.0 Military Personnel 15 20 5 
5.0 Operations and Maintenance 267 270 3 
 Total Life Cycle Costs 7,275 9,130 1,840 
This table uses BY2004 dollars in millions. 
 
B. COST ESTIMATING 
Navigating cost estimation within defense acquisition is equally as complex as the 
defense acquisition framework itself. The application of cost analysis and furthermore, cost 
estimating requires the understanding of a cost estimate’s function within the acquisition 
framework as well as the methods used to produce these snapshots in time. Regardless of 
one’s understanding, cost estimates are critical for effective MDA acquisition oversight 
and decision-making (Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation [CAPE], 2017). 
The GAO guidebook states that cost estimates also serve to feed or support the cyclical 
federal budget cycle, impacting budget requests and proper alignment of resources, and 
seek to improve the financial performance of the DOD (Richey et al., 2009). 
According to Cost Estimation Methods and Tools (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015), 
there are some general principles for anyone seeking to use cost estimates as a method to 
assist in decision-making. The first is that cost estimates are not precise, but rather are 
thorough and complete, meaning they possess key characteristics: completeness, 
reasonableness, credibility, and analytical defensibility. Second, while a thorough and 
complete cost estimate may have been provided at the time the CE was developed, 
assumptions were made. Understanding the assumptions within the CEs is critical to sound 
decision-making moving forward as well as looking back at the CE’s accuracy at a later 
date. Third, change will always occur. Tariffs on raw materials, a newly passed wage rate 
for the contractor’s state of operation, congressional funding, and sequestration all impact 
the costs being estimated. Fourth, “cost issues are always a major concern, but they are 
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almost never the only concern” (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 4). Fifth, CEs are “guides” 
to enabling decision-makers, not the answer. And last, cost estimates are an amalgamation 
of people, processes, and the data. Each of these elements is a product of its time and likely 
to change as newer technology creates ways to capture and apply data, people receive 
higher levels of education, and newer ways to analyze the data become available (Mislick 
& Nussbaum, 2015). 
1. Cost Estimating in Defense Acquisition 
CAPE and its director (DCAPE) execute the statutory guidance and requirements 
found within DOD 5000.01 and DOD 5000.02 in order to guide acquisition professionals 
toward sound decision-making practices. There are three particular applications of cost 
estimating that CEs influence: long-term planning, budgeting, and choosing an alternative 
(Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). All three of these broader categories are nested within the 
DAS, and the statutory requirements that necessitate the CEs are directly tied to one or 
more of these categories for decision-making. As a result of the requirements to influence 
broader objectives, CAPE is deliberately intertwined into the DAS to ensure compliance, 
as outlined in Figure 9. 
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PMO in this figure stands for project management office. SCA is the service cost agency 
or defense equivalent. CA is the office of Cost Assessment (CAPE). Timelines differ 
depending on ACAT. 
Figure 9. CAPE and PMO Interaction for an ACAT ID Program. Source: 
CAPE (2017). 
Using Figure 9 to simplify, the PMO not only contacts CAPE for support of major 
events, but it also develops the CARD used to facilitate the CEs. Before the PMO is 
authorized to begin its POE, the CARD must be deemed sufficient by CAPE. The final 
outputs required by the PMO include a completed POE and a full funding memorandum 
used to grant approval at the upcoming milestone. CAPE not only supports review of the 
CARD developed by the PMO, but it also produces the required ICE at major decision 
points. An independent government cost estimate (IGCE), or ICE, attempts to answer five 
primary questions in order to properly educate its audience while providing enough context 
so the data represented in the CE can be used by the various stakeholders within the 
program. 
1. How was the estimate made? 
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2. What assumptions were made? 
3. What information/tools were used? 
4. Where was the information obtained from? 
5. How did previous estimates compare with prices paid? (DOD, 2018a, p. 7) 
These questions are intended to ensure the cost estimate developed has a clearly defined 
purpose and scope, partnered with a realistic schedule of completion. The purpose of the 
estimate is critical to informing the estimating team on the scope and schedule and is 
effectively the first critical step to developing a cost estimate. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has outlined 12 steps that ensure the cost estimate is 
generated effectively. The steps of CE development are not a linear checklist process of 
steps but rather, an iterative process that constantly seeks to improve itself through analysis. 
Figure 10 details the 12 steps showing the ideal cost estimate production steps. 
 
Figure 10. 12-Step Cost Estimate Process. Source: Richey et al. (2009). 
2. Cost-Estimating Methods 
The DOD utilizes four common methods and one ancillary method when needed to 
deliver CEs. Each method used carries different risks for the decision-maker regarding its 
utility as the program moves forward in time. Cost estimates are data points in time, but as 
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the time elapses and actions are taken within the PMO, change in costs immediately ensue. 
Understanding the cost-estimation methods at a “greater than surface-level” understanding 
may effectively reduce a program’s cost and schedule breach. Selecting the appropriate 
cost estimate methodology, and likely combination of methods, may likely yield the 
greatest quality cost estimate (NASA Cost Analysis Division, 2015). For this project, 
special attention is made with respect to the various assumptions regarding the JCM’s 
improvement curves and production rates. Figure 11 shows where each method is likely 
used with respect to the program phases. This figure highlights the relationship between 
the cost-estimation method and the amount of detail an estimate may produce given the 
program’s position across the life cycle. 
 
Figure 11. Cost Estimates Required and Methods Used. Source: R. Mortlock 
(personal communication, November 14, 2019) 
a. Analogy 
The analogy cost-estimating methodology is typically used early in a program’s life 
cycle due to the lack of specific data relating to the actual program. With the lack of a 
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clearly defined system, analogy cost estimating seeks to find a previously fielded system 
that is comparable and is an aspect that reliably drives cost, then baselines those costs 
subjectively and accepts the former program’s costs as a basis for the estimate. This method 
often relies heavily on the expertise of the cost estimate team (CET) to subjectively adjust 
upward or downward depending on the complexity of the comparable systems (Richey et 
al., 2009). 
b. Parametric 
The Parametric Estimating Handbook (International Society of Parametric 
Analysts [ISPA], 2008)1 is a complete guide to the application of what is considered the 
“top down” approach to cost estimating—parametric methodology. It uses statistical 
relationships between a few key pieces of data that are similar to the program being 
estimated. Understanding the cost drivers of similar programs enables the CET to develop 
a hypothesis to predict the future costs of the current program. This estimate method has a 
wide variety of applications and can be done as soon as the CET has a hypothesis as to the 
likely cost drivers of the current program. The historical data in comparison that used the 
same cost drivers is normalized before conducting a regression analysis. The regression 
analysis will determine whether the data used was a good fit for the comparison and if so, 
will then be applied to predict the costs of the new program (ISPA, 2008). 
c. Engineering 
Considered a “bottom up” estimate, the engineering cost estimate methodology 
requires significant amounts of data. Engineering CEs require a form of work breakdown 
structure (WBS) at the lowest levels, historical data of similar programs, and actual costs. 
Engineers intimately familiar with the work being analyzed assist the CET in developing 
the costs that are related to the CE. This method is typically used once a program has 
entered into production or after the program has gone through either a preliminary or 
                                                 
1 IPSA merged with the Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis to become the International Cost 
Estimate and Analysis Association (ICEAA) in November 2012. 
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critical design review. By using the figures found in the program’s designs, the CET then 
has enough data to support the engineering method. (ISPA, 2008). 
d. Actuals 
Often referred to as extrapolation from actual costs, this methodology uses the 
current program’s costs to predict future costs of the same or like item(s). Average costs 
can and sometimes are used to predict the cost of future units. Estimates at completion 
(EAC) are also actual CEs using various earned value management (EVM) data points to 
predict terminal production costs. The most common actual cost estimates are those 
predicting costs through improvement curves, commonly known as learning curves. 
Estimating costs using “learning curve” theory can greatly reduce the predicted future cost 
of a program. Advancements in cost improvement theory have led to an added variable to 
the improvement curve calculations. That variable becomes the production rate, indicating 
the number of units produced during the period. Use of production rates to influence cost 
estimates is applicable where large production occurs at various rates, thus influencing the 
slope related to learning (ISPA, 2008). 
e. Expert Opinion  
Although entirely subjective in nature, expert opinion is used when necessary. 
Typically, expert opinion is leveraged when no historical data is available, although the 
CET must pay special attention to the expert’s credibility and attempt to derive the source 
of the expert’s opinion. This method is not synonymous with the expertise applied by the 
CET to develop cost estimates. Table 3 is a collection of strengths and weaknesses for the 
various methods according to multiple sources.  
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Table 3. Strengths, Weaknesses, and Applications of Contract Estimating 
Methodologies. Adapted from Richey et al. (2009) and NASA 
(2015). 
Method Strength Weakness Application 
Analogy • Requires little data 
• Based on actual data 
• Reasonably quick 
• Easily understood 
• Accurate for minor 
deviations from the 
analog 
• Subjective adjustments 
• Accuracy depends on 
similarity of items 
• Difficult to assess effect 
of design change 
• Difficult to identify 
appropriate analog 








Parametric • Reasonably quick and 
can be replicated 
• Encourages discipline 
• Good audit trail 
• Objective, little bias 





• Lacks detail 
• Model investment 
• Cultural barriers 
• Need to understand 
model’s behavior 
• Loses predictive ability/







• Baseline estimate 




Engineering • Easily audited 
• Sensitive to labor 
rates 
• Tracks vendor quotes 
• Time honored 
• Requires detailed design 







Actual • Reliance on historical 
costs to predict future 
costs 
• Great credibility and 
reliability for 
estimating costs 
• Ability to be applied 
to any level of data 
• Changes in the 
accounting of actual 
costs can be difficult 
• Results will be invalid if 
the production process 
or configuration are not 
stable 
• It should not be used for 
items outside the actual 
cost data range 
• Best suited to be 
used when 
predicting costs of 
future items that 
have already been 
through 
production 
Expert Opinion • Can be used when no 
historical data are 
available 
• Takes minimal time 
and is easy to 
implement once 
experts are assembled 
• Can be blended with 
other estimation 
techniques 
• Lack of objectivity 
• Risk that one expert will 
try to dominate a 
discussion 
• Not very accurate or 
valid as a primary 
estimating method 




3. Unpacking Improvement Curve Theory and Production Rates
Due to the variance between the JCM’s JCP and IGCE, this project aims to provide 
acquisition professionals with a better understanding of both improvement curve theory 
and production rate application as it relates to cost estimates. According to the CAIG ICE, 
The CAIG estimate of recurring production costs is based on a single, top-
level recurring production curve with a learning rate of 88 percent and a 
production rate effect of 90 percent. The parameters of the CAIG production 
cost curve are based on the pooled results of 12 prior missile production 
programs. In contrast, the JCP recurring production cost estimate is built 
from a much lower level with separate T1s2 and cost progress curves for 
each specific missile component. For example, the JCP for the millimeter 
wave seeker component employs learning and production rate effects of 89 
percent and 85 percent respectively. Thus, the JCP does not employ a single 
aggregate-level production cost curve. For comparative purposes, we 
statistically determined that the JCP recurring production cost estimate is 
consistent with a 93 percent learning rate and an 83 percent [production] 
rate effect. The JCP estimate, therefore, implicitly places far more 
importance on production rate rather than cumulative learning. Also, we 
note that the production rate slope value used in the JCP is quite aggressive 
by historical standards, although not entirely unprecedented. (R. Mortlock, 
personal communication, November 14, 2019) 
Synthesizing this quote, learning rates and production rates are directly linked, but the 
application of various rates of production may greatly change yearly budgeted dollars as 
depicted in the two JCM CEs. 
a. Improvement Curve Theory
In Better Business Decisions Using Cost Modeling for Procurement, Operations, 
and Supply Chain Professionals, the example of performing a laborious task repetitively 
results in a reduced amount of time for future executions of the same task. Another example 
is the procurement of a new personal device. Initially a guide or instruction pamphlet is 
required by the user to perform basic tasks. The requirement of a pamphlet instruction 
guide is quickly discarded and the user is capable of performing nearly all functions 
without much thinking. This is learning curve theory in practice. The reduction in time per 
2 T1 is referring to the theoretical first unit produced. This is typically represented as a figure of cost. 
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repetition represents the learning rates. At 100%, no learning is applied to the task, while 
80% rates of learning indicates a significant rate of learning for a repetitive process. The 
example of the personal device while simple, indicates the learning rate would closely 
resemble a rate at 80% rather than 100% (Sower & Sower, 2015). Figure 12 demonstrates 
a learning rate at 95% in the table, then from 95% to 85% in the chart plotting the curves. 
Figure 12. Example of Learning Rate Applied to 50-Hour Labor Task. 
Source: Sower and Sower (2015). 
According to the FORSCOM Handbook for Cost and Price Analysis (Forces 
Command DCS for Logistics, 2000), aeronautical engineers, when analyzing historical 
labor data regarding aircraft production, determined that there were specific rates of 
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improvement for each successful completion of production when the successive production 
quantities doubled. Given this discovery, the “Number of Repetitions” column found in 
Figure 12 doubles for each row of new data. The graphic representation found in Figure 12 
demonstrates the potential steepness of learning that an 80% rate could have on the task it 
is applied to. Choosing the correct rate is critical to an accurate cost estimate (Sower & 
Sower, 2015). Furthermore, “the learning curve, as originally conceived, analyzed labor 
hours over successive production units of a manufactured item, but the theory behind it has 
now been adapted to account for cost improvement across the organization” (ISPA, 2008, 
p. 2–7). Improvement, or learning curve theory is demonstrated using the following 
equation from the ISPA (2008, p. 2–7): 
bY AX=  
where: 
Y = the cost of the Xth unit 
A = (theoretical) first unit (T1) cost 
X = unit number 
b = the slope coefficient (defined as the Ln (slope) / Ln (2))  
 
The ISPA handbook finds that  
there are two interpretations concerning how to apply this equation. In the 
unit interpretation, Y is the hours or cost of unit X only. In the cumulative 
average interpretation, Y is the average hours or cost of all units from 1 to 
X, inclusive. 
In parametric models, the learning curve is often used to analyze the direct 
cost of successively manufactured units. Direct cost equals the cost of both 
touch labor and direct materials in fixed dollars. This is sometimes called 
an improvement curve. The slope is calculated using hours or constant year 
dollars. (ISPA, 2008, p. 2–7) 
In addition to understanding the improvement curve theory formula, applying the 
right technique is appropriate. The GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (2019) 
orients estimators to analyze production environments in order to dictate which formulation 
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to use: unit formulation or cumulative average formulation. Choosing between the two is 
determined after analyzing the following factors: 
1. Analogous systems 
2. Industry standards 
3. Historic experiences 
4. Anticipated production environment 
There is not a basic set of rules for estimators to follow when applying the type of 
formulation to a learning curve, but typically analogous systems use unit; when industry 
standards are used, it is best to use cumulative average; historic experiences will follow a 
common theme; and anticipated production environments may vary depending on the 
capability of production an organization is prepared to execute (Richey et al., 2009). 
(1) Unit Curve Theory 
According to Cost Estimation Methods and Tools (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015), 
there are primarily two types of improvement curve theories. The first is unit curve theory. 
The basic understanding of unit curve theory is that as the production doubles, the cost to 
produce that amount decreases by a constant percentage. That percentage is the inverse of 
the learn rate applied. For example, if an 80% learning rate is applied, the cost of producing 
those units is reduced by 20%. Unit curve theory is typically used when production is well-
defined, design is stable, and production lead times are typically longer (Mislick & 
Nussbaum, 2015). 
(2) Cumulative Average Theory 
For cumulative average theory, “Y” in the previous formula is the cumulative 
average cost of “X” units. Additionally, “X” becomes the cumulative number of units 
produced. In addition, an 80% learning rate generates a 20% decrease in average unit cost. 
This theory is typically applied when early production environments have the following 
characteristics: 
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• Use of “soft” or prototype tooling 
• Inadequate supplier base established 
• Early design changes 
• Short lead times. (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 206) 
Given some or all of these production environment characteristics, the effect of averaging 
the unit costs helps reduce variation or “smooth” variations of unit costs (Mislick & 
Nussbaum, 2015). 
b. Improvement Curve Theory Historically Acceptable Rates 
Although there is not a set standard for rates, there are general guidelines for 
applying learning curve rates (slopes) depending on the characteristics of the industry and 
production environment. In Cost Estimation Methods and Tools (Mislick & Nussbaum, 
2015) they offer the following: 
• If an operation is 75% manual and 25% automated, slopes are generally 
in the 80% vicinity 
• If an operation is 50% manual and 50% automated, slopes are generally 
about 85% 
• If an operation is 25% manual and 75% automated, slopes are generally 
about 90%. 
• Shipbuilding slopes are generally in the 80–85% range. 
The average slope for the aircraft industry is about 85%. But departments 
within an organization can vary greatly from that. Assuming repetitive 
operations within an industry, typical slopes may include: 
• Electrical: 75–85% 
• Electronics: 90–95% 
• Machining: 90–95% 
• Welding: 88–92%. (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 184) 
c. Production Rate 
Production rates are an advancement of learning curve theory. As production 
increases, economies of scale set in, therefore reducing costs. The inverse is also true as 
breaks in production occur, or production rates decrease; costs tend to rise. The efficiency 
of production can be explained by adding a variable rate to the preexisting learning curve 
formula (Richey et al., 2009). This is demonstrated using the following equation: 
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b rY AX Q=  
where: 
Y = the cost of the Xth unit 
A = (Theoretical) first unit (T1) cost 
X = unit number 
b = the slope coefficient (defined as the Ln (slope) / Ln (2)) 
Q = production rate (quantity produced during the period or lot) 
r = rate coefficient (Ln (production curve slope) / Ln (2)) 
 
The ISPA handbook recommends  
the equation is generally applicable only when there is substantial 
production at various rates. The production rate variable (Qr) adjusts the 
first unit dollars (A) for various production rates during the life of the 
production effort. The equation also yields a rate-affected slope related to 
learning. (ISPA, 2008, p. 2–8) 
d. JCM learning and production rates as a check on learning 
By using the formulas outlined in this chapter, the data from Tables 4 and 5 and 









Table 4. JCM Estimates Examined. Adapted from R. Mortlock (personal 
communication, November 14, 2019). 
JCM Estimates Data Provided 
  JCP ICE 
Recurring Production 
Costs  $4,790,000,000   Unknown  
T1  Unknown   Unknown  
Learning Rate 93% 88% 
Production Rate 83% 90% 
Missiles to be Produced 48,613 48,613 
      
JCP Data as variables Notes 
Y=  $4,790,000,000  Given in JCP 
A=  Unknown    
X= (1;48,613) Given in JCP and ICE 
b= -0.1047 (Log(0.93)/Log(2)) 
Q= (quantity of lot size) Given in JCP. Ref. Table 5. 
r= -0.2688 (Log(0.83)/Log(2)) 
      
ICE Data as variables Notes 
Y=  Unknown  ICE(Y)= JCP(Y)*1.25 
A=  Unknown  ICE(A)= JCP(A)*.84 
X= (1;48,613) Given in JCP and ICE 
b= -0.1844 (Log(0.88)/Log(2)) 
Q= (quantity of lot size) Given in JCP. Ref. Table 5. 
r= -0.1520 (Log(0.90)/Log(2)) 
Table 5. JCM Procurement Profile. Adapted from R. Mortlock (personal 
communication, November 14, 2019). 
  JCM Procurement profile 
Fiscal Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Procurement 
quantity 























With the combination of both of the JCM cost estimates, the only variable left 
undefined for the JCP is the JCP T1. In an attempt to validate the data is accurate in the 
two reports the following is an example of using the production rate formula to solve for 
28 
the JCP T1. To get to the JCP T1, the following computations were made using the 












By using Excel and setting “A” equal to 1 and using all other defined variables of 
the production rate formula, each unit produced an individual fraction of the total T1 value. 
Summing each of the T1 parts or γ, then dividing the total recurring production costs by γ, 
the JCP is determined to have a T1 value of $2,657,412. 
The list below displays some discrepancies within the two estimates using after 
solving for the JCP T1. 
• Using the computed JCP T1 value of $2,657,412 and applying the 
appropriate learning and production rates, the ICE T1 would equal 
$2,648,497. This is calculated using the recurring production value of the 
JCP*1.25. 
• The variance of T1s as stated in the ICE is 16%. JCP T1 is $2,657,412. 
ICE T1 is calculated using the assumed recurring production values for the 
ICE (JCP*1.25), at $2,648,497. This is less than 1% variance between the 
two estimates. 
• The ICE inaccurately captured the procurement and total costs for the JCP. 
According to the JCP, procurement was $6.023b and total cost was 
$7.275b. 
• According to the ICE, there was only a 5% difference in non-recurring 
procurement costs. Using a 25% difference in recurring production 
difference, no values calculated come close to the 16% T1 difference. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The application of teaching through case study has been applied for nearly a century 
by one of the most elite business schools in the country, Harvard Business School (HBS). 
According to TopMBA.com, roughly 30% of instruction time spent at top business schools 
is dedicated to learning through case study (TopMBA, 2017). Harvard, also being the 
global leader in case study development and sales, immerses its Master of Business 
Administration (MBA) students in nearly 500 cases throughout the two-year curriculum. 
“Simply put, we believe the case method is the best way to prepare students for the 
challenges of leadership” (Harvard Business School [HBS], n.d.). 
1. Significance of Teaching Through Case Study 
Case studies have been an integral part of academia for centuries, as they provide 
the student the opportunity to develop within the context of the study. This context offers 
the student the ability to become a stakeholder without the presence of loss or profit. “In 
terms of professional education, the key to effective preparation ultimately rests with the 
value employers and other end-users place on the focus, emphasis, and balance between 
the academic and practical in relationship to their own expectations for skills graduates 
must have to garner their interest” (Newman et al., 2019, p. 3). 
Specific to the use of case study within higher education institutions (HEI) was the 
article “The Need for Case Studies to Illustrate Quality Practice: Teaching in Higher 
Education to Ensure Quality of Entry Level Professionals” (Newman et al., 2019). The 
article highlights the notion that organizations that pride themselves as reputable service 
providers or institutions are professional in nature, meaning that the organizations 
themselves follow ethical standards, are representative of expertise, and seek improvement 
of public perception through practice and self-regulation. The medical profession, business 
sector, and academia are thoroughbred examples of professional institutions that perform 
self-regulation and/or regulation while also always developing ways to increase capability 
(Newman et al., 2019). 
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According to two graduate-level educators, the central purpose of management 
education is to prepare students to operate effectively and responsibly within the 
unpredictable business environment. Students must be equipped with the knowledge of 
general business practices but also the increasingly difficult ability to socially perform 
within a team environment, and in most cases, lead (Prystupa & Luethi, 2017). While it is 
simple to issue institutional knowledge through lectures, lecturing alone will not produce 
the type of professional needed in the business environment. The use of case study 
appropriately forces students to independently absorb the material, analyze the case, and 
be prepared to debate, interact, or take direct action with others incumbent upon how the 
case study is proctored. The latter is the critical aspect of teaching through case study, 
which enriches both the students and teacher. The challenges students face from both their 
teachers and colleagues compel students to take ownership of their thoughts, opinions, and 
actions. These repetitions learned in the classroom environment are the outcomes that allow 
teaching through the case study method to thrive. 
In 2008, the University of Oklahoma began seeking reform in the Department of 
Educational Administration, Curriculum, and Supervision for its Doctor of Education 
(EdD) degree. According to Using JCEL case studies to meet ELCC standards, there were 
three concerns that were driving the redesign of the program: 
1. Writing skills of students 
2. Faculty wanting some measure of what students had learned throughout 
the program because the general exam, over time, had morphed into a 
literature review or conceptualization of the students’ dissertations 
3. Driven by self-regulation, faculty expressing concerns with the National 
Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) requirements, 
specifically needing a way to capture that students were capable of 
demonstrating knowledge across specific domains. (Bass et al., 2011) 
What the University of Oklahoma faculty found was a single solution that addressed all 
three concerns—teaching through case study. Given that their profession had developed, 
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over time, a database of cases from which to teach—the Journal of Cases in Educational 
Leadership (JCEL)—faculty members now had a way to address their concerns. They were 
able to sift through the cases available in JCEL and utilize ones that brought dilemma and 
individual inquiry. Using case studies that students could relate to meant greater learning 
from each case study as well. Most notable to any profession was the following finding: 
Case analysis goes beneath the surface of the details of the cases to become 
a vehicle for self-examination and self-awareness. Self-knowledge is 
important to teacher leaders and administrators because of the diverse pool 
of constituents with whom they work: that is, central administration, 
building-level leadership teams, teachers, students, community networks, 
and parents. As students discuss cases in groups, their approach to technical 
or ethical dilemmas becomes apparent to their classmates and to 
themselves. As students work in groups, they learn their own biases as they 
discover that their opinion of how a case should be handled is different from 
those of their classmates. They are able to see that their personal approach 
to case analysis is influenced by their backgrounds and prior experiences. 
Students then move to think critically as they work through their differences 
with colleagues. (Bass et al., 2011, p. 11) 
2. Writing a Case Study 
While HBS primarily started teaching through case study in the early 1920s, other 
disciplines like law and medicine used case study as a central teaching mechanism even 
before that. Arguably equally critical to the application of case study to enrich learning 
outcomes is the practice of properly writing a case study. According to Starostka and 
Kurzyk (2017), an effective case study has a unique format and structure that is coupled 
with teaching instructions. From there, the case must include learning objectives. Having 
these key parts work in unison becomes the foundation for a well-written case study. As a 
method to achieve a well written case study, Starostka and Kurzyk offer a process by which 
one should develop a case study. The process can be seen in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Four Stages of Case Study Development. Source: Starostka and 
Kurzyk (2017). 
Anna Pikos (2017), in Writing a Case Study: Research Design, focused more on 
Steps 2 through 4 as outlined in Figure 13. Her findings suggested there is more of an 
abstract approach to developing a case study after its purpose has been clearly articulated 
and outlined. The strategic decisions outlined in Step 1 of Figure 13 show a methodical 
and deliberate approach to case study development, while Pikos suggested that case study 
development must be driven by data which the writer can collect. The approach of the 
writer may vary, but the data and subsequent case are dependent on thorough and 
exhaustive data collection. The more time the writer spends on research, the more enriched 
the case study becomes (Pikos, 2017). 
B. WHY COST ESTIMATES MATTER 
As previously mentioned, there are three main reasons why cost estimates are used 
within the DOD. According to Mislick and Nussbaum (2015), they are the following: 
Long-term planning: Long-term planning is part of strategic planning. Cost 
estimating fills the critical role of providing affordability analyses. It is true 
in all organizations—both government and nongovernment—that strategic 
changes are made only over the course of multiple years and it is necessary 
to know whether the costs associated with the change are “affordable.” 
(Note: there are many ways to define affordable!) It is the cost estimating 
community that provides these initial cost estimates, and then it is others 
who decide where these estimates can be “afforded.” Nevertheless, it is the 
cost estimating profession that provides the estimates of the resources 
necessary to embark upon and pursue these strategic changes. 
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Budgeting: As an intrinsic part of building and refining budgets, cost 
estimating supports a series of activities that are aligned with the budgeting 
process. These activities include developing initial cost estimates for budget 
preparation, justifying cost estimates, and amending the estimates in the 
light of changing/changed circumstances. 
Choosing among alternatives: In support of decision-makers who must 
explore options and choose among alternatives, cost estimating supports the 
process by providing cost estimates and comparisons among the costs of 
alternative options for achieving a particular goal. It is applied to choosing 
among options in many walks of life. (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015, p. 15) 
 
1. DOD Develops CE Enterprise 
Similar to the JCM program birth, the CAPE as it is known today (formerly known 
as CAIG), was the defense department’s response to congressional and constituent 
concerns about mismanagement of taxpayer dollars. According to Donald Srull (1998) in 
The Cost Analysis Improvement Group: A History, these congressional concerns were part 
of a larger, darker concern that the American people and their politicians recognized within 
the wake of the Vietnam War. In 1969, Congress mandated that the DOD publish system 
acquisition reports (SAR) in order to start an accountability process for the DOD and its 
flailing acquisition management network (Srull, 1998). 
These reports, acquisition activities, and all matters within the DOD were further 
complicated by the ongoing war in Vietnam. The PPBE process had arrived a few short 
years before the start of the Vietnam conflict, and the DOD was still playing catch-up to 
its revolutionary budget process (Srull, 1998). To aid the Secretary of Defense, a counsel 
was developed, which similarly still exists today, to aid with decision-making regarding 
acquisition. These assistant secretaries of defense (ASDs include a comptroller, 
installations and logistics, and systems analysis (SA). Despite this counsel’s charge, by 
1971, further cost and schedule overages plagued the DOD.  
According to Srull (1998), the environment had shifted beneath the DOD in a 
matter of years, and by December 1971, the CAIG was established to assist the DOD with 
estimating costs early and often within the acquisition life cycle. The birth of the CAIG 
started within the SA office when it began comparing initial cost estimates with actual 
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program costs in order to better understand the cost overages that had continued to mar the 
DOD. The cost comparisons were drastically different. There were many reasons for this. 
First, the nation had been at constant war for decades, with only intermittent gaps between 
conflicts, leaving little time to improve existing practices and gain efficiencies. Second, as 
cost estimating became relevant to the DOD, there were little to no data available to the 
estimators because most of the technology being developed lacked an analogous program 
or had only historical costs for comparison. Third, many of the DOD’s programs were 
developed in an environment where cost was not a driving function, as procurement 
focused on “the newest and most advanced weapons at any cost” (Srull, 1998, p. 8). 
2. Application of CEs 
While acknowledging the main reasons to perform a cost estimate, the application 
of cost estimates varies based on the user. Often, cost estimates receive unfettered 
recognition when a figure or set of figures (estimates) are used to disparage the DOD for 
cost and schedule overruns. This typically comes in the fashion of a GAO report or a 
consulting firm’s release of a summary of findings regarding cost growths for DOD 
programs. In any case, almost all materials found for this literature review were lacking the 
application of the CEs in the manner for which they were intended. Presumably, this is in 
large part because the nature in which cost estimates are developed leave tangible numbers 
to reference regardless of time. Numbers, especially dollar amounts in the billions, cast 
enormous shadows that the DOD must operate within when it fails to deliver. 
An example of the use of cost estimates to report on DOD effectiveness is 
Lineberger’s (2016) Program Management in Aerospace and Defense: Still Late and Over 
Budget. As a collective, the report provides a number of well-researched figures that show 
a positive outlook for defense acquisition, but it also highlights where trouble within the 
DOD acquisition environment may still loom. Using previous cost estimates to establish 
projected costs, the report finds that “total cost growth of today’s MDAP [Major Defense 
Acquisition Program] portfolio over the original baseline estimates is 48.3 percent and an 
average delay of 29.5 months. In dollar terms, the combined cost overrun for all programs 
in 2015 was US$468 billion, up from US$295 billion from a similar study eight years ago” 
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(Lineberger, 2016, p. 8). Figure 14 shows how MDAP programs have fared in comparison 
to their baselines. 
 
Figure 14. Current Cost Overrun since Original Estimate. Source: Lineberger 
(2016). 
Beyond the analysis of cost overrun for MDAP programs in Lineberger’s (2016) 
report is a table of findings that compares cost estimates with a current cost and its cost +/- 
over the course of five years. Figure 15 is particularly helpful in understanding how CEs 
can drive a budget or appropriation for both the DOD and Congress. 
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Amounts are U.S. 2016 dollars in millions. 
Figure 15. Defense Programs with Major Cost Variations. Source: Lineberger 
(2016). 
The benefit of this figure allows industry, Congress, and the DOD to see where and 
why cost overruns occurred. Given that CEs offer, at a given time, a sound and accurate 
estimate, there is utility in analyzing how far a program slips from that point of deviation. 
As the DOD collects more data, like the SA office did early in the 1970s, there is the 
likelihood that cost estimates will increase in accuracy. 
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IV. JOINT COMMON MISSILE CASE STUDY 
A. SITUATION 
The Army has selected you as an assistant program manager (APM) for the JCM 
program located at Redstone Arsenal, AL, within PEO TM. As required by both acquisition 
branch and human resources command, you reach out to the incumbent APM at the JCM 
program. You are excited to get caught up to speed on the program, and although the outgoing 
APM is constantly on temporary duty (TDY), she does respond promptly through email when 
connected. She recommends taking a deep dive into the JCM acquisition strategy to 
understand the program upon arrival, as well as reviewing all materials related to cost 
estimating, specifically learning curve theory and production rates. The variance between the 
ICE and the JCP are concerning to the leadership at PO JCM as they must discuss the 
differences with the MDA at MS B. Your arrival to JCM will come just prior to the DAE’s 
DAB to facilitate JCM approval to enter into EMD post-MS B review. Program affordability 
will be the theme of discussion. Figure 16 represents the JCM design at this time. 
 
Figure 16. Notional JCM Design. Source: R. Mortlock (personal 
communication, January 9, 2020). 
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1. Program Background 
The JCM program’s path is unique, but the facts for where the program started through 
its current decision point are within the strategy document. The program is a joint ACAT ID 
program and the first-ever to utilize the JCIDS process. It is also an international program 
with one of the United States’ closest allies, the United Kingdom. The development of the 
JCM capitalizes on existing S&T contracts executed by PEO TM that paid contractors to 
improve current missile technologies through R&D. The JCM program is seeking to merge 
multiple missile programs and capabilities into one modular system, thus improving 
capability while reducing logistical burdens within the DOD. The preexisting missile 
contracts were critical to enabling JCM to traverse the acquisition framework from capability 
gap in 1999 to hopefully an initial materiel solution by 2005, and an initial operational 
capability (IOC) by 2009 (R. Mortlock, personal communication, November 14, 2019). The 
program is facing MS B review, telling you that the program has completed its TMRR phase 
and is postured to start the EMD phase upon approval from the MDA (OUSD[A&S], 2020). 
To this point, the JCM has technology that is independently rated at technology 
readiness level (TRL) 6 and above. In order to reduce the risk of combining multiple 
independent technologies into one system, the program intends to be developed incrementally. 
According to The Joint Common Missile Project: Program Management Lessons Learned, 
JCM PO also mitigated risk by focusing on modeling and simulation (M&S) during TMRR. 
In the request for proposal released in 2003, the proposal required contractors to include 
integrated flight simulation (IFS) as a driver to reduce risk later in the program’s life cycle 
(Mortlock, 2005). 
According to the acquisition strategy, JCM PO seeks to reduce risk by initiating EMD 
with multiple development efforts for critical technologies before beginning missile 
production. You remember from your initial acquisition training that competitive prototyping 
begins sometime after MS A unless waived by the MDA. In the JCM acquisition strategy, 
you only read how each contractor tested their specific technologies through prototypes and 
simulation, but the overall program did not have an all-inclusive prototype before arriving at 
MS B (OUSD[A&S], 2020). 
39 
2. Assignment 
A day after your arrival to JCM PO, you receive the DAB slideshow, the JCP, and the 
ICE from the outgoing APM. You also receive your first official assignment as an acquisition 
officer, courtesy of your new boss, the JCM PM. You must review all documents and be 
prepared to discuss with the JCM PM two days prior to the DAB (which takes place this 
Friday). Since you initiated fact-finding and cost-estimating background information prior to 
your arrival to PEO TM, you have a head start before feedback is required. Your analysis 
must review the DAB slide presentation to establish the JCM PO standpoint, concerns, and 
positions heading into EMD. You must also review the CEs to potentially identify any 
additional risks or assumptions that the PO must include in the DAB. Due to the sensitivity of 
the DAB and its impending execution, bring any major concerns or recommendations to JCM 
PM immediately to reconcile. 
B. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
Set 1: 
1. What are some basic facts as it relates to the JCM program after reading the 
acquisition strategy report? 
2. Who are the primary stakeholders for the JCM program, and why? 
3. What is cost estimating? Why is it done so frequently during a program’s life 
cycle? 
4. What are the primary methods of cost estimating? Explain in your own 
words what they are and when they might be used. 
5. What is improvement curve theory and the associated production rate 
theory? What are their main differences? 
Set 2: 
1. The JCP reconciled differences between the program office estimate (POE) 
and the component cost analysis (CCA), performed by service cost estimate 
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organizations. For RDT&E costs, what was the primary cost estimating 
technique used by the POE? For the CCA? 
2. Within the JCP for procurement costs, what is the largest cost element and 
why? 
3. What cost estimating methodologies were used for recurring production for 
the POE and CCA? 
4. What cost estimating methodologies were used for fielding costs for the POE 
and CCA? 
5. Describe the primary differences between the JCP and the CAIG ICE? 
6. With respect to recurring production, assumptions must be made about what 
primary drivers for the cost estimates? 
7. Using the provided Excel document, give the T1s for the JCP and the ICE. 
8. How can the T1, or theoretical first unit, for the CAIG ICE be lower than the 
T1 for the JCP, but the total cost estimate in CAIG ICE for recurring 
production be higher than in the JCP? 
9. For recurring production, what does the CAIG ICE place more importance 
on: learning or production? 
10. What, if any, are the risks associated with the JCP in terms of affordability, 
given the comparison between the JCP and the ICE? 
11. What, if any, are the risks associated with the ICE in terms of affordability, 
given the comparison between the JCP and the ICE? 
12. What recommendations do you make to PM regarding JCM affordability? 
Why? 
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C. JCM PROGRAM MATERIALS FOR ANALYSIS 
The following sections are required to complete your review but are not all-inclusive 
on the analysis required to make recommendations to the JCM PM in two days’ time. 
1. Joint Common Missile Joint Cost Position Summary 
The JCM JCP is a compilation of multiple cost estimates refined by a CRBWG, which 
produced one final estimate, the JCP (R. Mortlock, personal communication, November 14, 
2019). The service lead for JCM, the USA, developed a POE and a CCA based off original 
assumptions of procurement and source selection. Those figures are represented under POE 
and CCA. It is important to note that both these columns are representative of assumptions to 
produce 30,978 missiles for the USA and two contracted sources for seeker development. The 
program was determined to be unaffordable with those assumptions; therefore the program 
was reconfigured to produce 15,613 missiles for the USA and reduce the number of seeker 
sources to a single contracted source. The USN portion of the JCP was accepted by Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) and Naval Cost Analysis Division (NCAD). The final JCP 
position compiles a combination of assumptions between the USA cost estimates and the 
exact figures provided by the USN cost estimate (R. Mortlock, personal communication, 
November 14, 2019). 
The following assumptions are factored into all POE and CCA figures, thus 
influencing the JCP. 
• Cost presented in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 constant dollars 
• Used January 2004 inflation indices 
• Unique Navy requirements estimated by NAVAIR 
• Scope of estimate is for Increment 1 
• Phase 1: Risk Reduction (12-14 Months); Phase 2: System Demonstration 
(36 Months) 
• RDT&E: Cost plus incentive fee-type contract 
• LRIP: FY2008-FY2009 (fixed price incentive-type contract) 
• Long-lead required for all LRIP procurements beginning in FY2007 
• Full-rate production starts in FY2010 (fixed price contract) 
• Army platform is the Apache (AH-64D) with M299 launcher; software 
only changes to platform 
• Navy platforms include the Cobra (AH-1Z), F/A-18, and MH-60; software 
and hardware changes to the platforms 
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• No additional manpower required for the M299 launcher maintenance 
• Shared learning based on missile procurement of Army 15,613 and Navy 
33,000 
• Rate curve is applied to procurement 
• Missile is a certified round; will not require field maintenance 
• Software maintained by AMRDEC Software Engineering Directorate 
(SED; Level 4 certified in capability maturity model) 
• Stockpile reliability testing will be conducted 
• Software upgrades in FY2013, FY2018, FY2023 
• Applies a 10% reduction to LRIP 1 & 2 to compensate for competition 
during source selection 
• Counter Active Protection System (CAPS) placed on 10% of rounds (R. 
Mortlock, personal communication, November 14, 2019) 
The four main areas to highlight within the JCP are RDT&E, procurement, operations 
and maintenance, and the JCM PO’s risk mitigation efforts. Tables 6–8 break down the 
various estimates and their associated costs based on the methods used by each. 
a. JCP Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
Table 6. JCP RDT&E cost elements. Source: R. Mortlock (personal 
communication, November 14, 2019). 
 
The POE and CCA reflect the original assumptions for multiple sources and quantities. JCP 
position reflects proper source amount and reduced amount for USA JCM missiles. 
This table uses BY2004 dollars in millions. 
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The JCP also articulates that much of the variance between the POE and CCA are due 
to the methods of cost estimating applied to the JCM program. The POE relied heavily on the 
analogy method, while the CCA utilized cost estimating relationships (parametric) for the 
majority of their cost elements depicted in Table 4. According to the JCP, the CRBWG 
analyzed each of the estimates to determine the most suitable estimate for the JCP. In most 
cases, it resulted in the JCP adopting the figures of the POE, and not the CCA, with caveats. 
The CRBWG identified that certain areas of both estimates failed to account for the multiple 
sensors integrated into a single seeker, creating risk, and therefore producing figures greater 
than typically found in the POE figures. The minor adjustments are annotated throughout the 
JCP. 
According to the JCP, another major difference between the POE and CCA estimates 
for RDT&E was captured in the theoretical firsts and how they were applied to prototype 
manufacturing. The POE used analogous comparisons to the Javelin missile and its 
components and subcomponents. The CCA again utilized CERs to develop its cost estimates. 
The recurring theme between the two estimates is the utilization of analogy method for the 
POE and the CCA using parametric with some analogy and expert opinion where certain data 
was not available (R. Mortlock, personal communication, November 14, 2019). 
b. JCP Procurement 
The next cost component to be analyzed is procurement costs. Within the JCP, this 
cost pool accounts for 83% of the total cost to the program. The cost drivers for procurement 
are recurring production costs, SE program management, fielding, and other procurement 
(software maintenance). Table 5 shows the breakout of the major lines of cost that produce 
the total procurement cost. 
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Table 7. JCP Procurement Cost Elements. Source: R. Mortlock (personal 
communication, November 14, 2019).  
 
This table uses BY2004 dollars in millions. 
 
The most important cost driver to procurement is recurring production, shown in 
Table 5 as line item 2.02 and is valued at a final position of just over $4 billion for the JCM 
program. It is within recurring production and additional procurement costs that the learning 
curves and production rates greatly impact the total cost of the program. According to the 
CRBWG, the POE estimate relied heavily on analogy costs to derive T1s for the components 
and subcomponents of recurring production based on comparisons to the Javelin missile 
program. Again, the CCA relied more heavily on CERs and analogies to similar systems. 
c. JCP Operations and Maintenance 
Although most typical hardware programs generate the majority of their costs during 
operations and maintenance (O&M), the JCM program’s major costs are a product of 
production. As stated earlier, there are some key assumptions that drive down cost during 
O&M. The most important assumption derived from the list above is that the JCM round, 
once fielded, will not require field maintenance. Another important assumption is that the 
software maintenance needed to be performed is on the systems operating the munition and 
not the munition itself. Due to these assumptions, the final JCP cost element for O&M equates 
to just 3% of the total program cost. Table 6 shows the final breakdown of cost elements for 
O&M according to the JCP (R. Mortlock, personal communication, November 14, 2019). 
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Table 8. JCP Operations and Maintenance Cost Elements. Source: R. 
Mortlock (personal communication, November 14, 2019). 
 
This table uses BY2004 dollars in millions. 
 
According to the JCP, the CRBWG determined that the spare parts, repair parts, and 
software drove the cost elements for O&M. Of note, only the CCA followed the assumptions 
outlined at the beginning of the JCP by only recognizing software maintenance for their 
estimate. Additionally, the USN position, and the one adopted by the JCP, had zero dollars 
allocated for software maintenance. The JCP utilized bottom-up and analogy methods to 
determine their final cost position. They used the Hellfire and Longbow Hellfire missiles to 
establish failure rates and repair rates base on missile manufacturing. 
d. JCP Risk Mitigation and Affordability 
According to the CRBWG, it was determined that the JCM program risk rating was 
low to moderate. Previous risks to the JCM were reliability and producibility, but since the 
establishment of the JCM PO, the efforts in engineering have reduced these risks. The JCP 
also states that the technical risks are migrating to low as well. Table 9 depicts the risk dollars 
used to mitigate the identified risks from earlier in the program (R. Mortlock, personal 
communication, November 14, 2019). 
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Table 9. JCP Risk Dollar Allocations. Source: R. Mortlock (personal 
communication, November 14, 2019).  
 
This table uses BY2004 dollars in millions. 
 
As it relates to program affordability, the JCP offers a promising outlook to the JCM 
program. Table 10 illustrates how well the program has estimated costs to maintain 
affordability. Overall, the program has a negative delta just twice in the next seven years of 
budgeted dollars. The greatest concern being $2 million in FY2008. The JCM PO’s plan to 
address both negative deltas is found within the table (R. Mortlock, personal communication, 
November 14, 2019). 
Table 10. JCP Affordability Assessment. Source: R. Mortlock (personal 




2. CAIG ICE for JCM Program Summary 
The independent cost estimate performed by CAIG (now CAPE) has a different story 
to tell as it describes JCM affordability, but the net difference between the two CEs is just 
25% as shown in Table 11. The primary differences between the two cost estimates is the 
development effort needed for the JCM and the recurring production costs for the missile. 
According to the ICE, both O&M and military personnel cost elements were well within 
estimating margins and therefore, were not captured in the summary report. 
Table 11. JCM JCP and CAIG ICE Life-Cycle Cost Comparison. Adapted 
from R. Mortlock (personal communication, November 14, 2019). 
Cost Element 





% of Cost 
Increases JCP CAIG 
1.0 RDT&E 970 1,350 380 39% 21% 
2.0 Procurement 6,023 7,490 1,467 24% 79% 
4.0 Military Personnel 15 20 5 33% 0% 
5.0 Operations and Maintenance 267 270 3 1% 0% 
 Total Life Cycle Costs 7,275 9,130 1,840 25%  
This table uses BY 2004 dollars in millions. 
 
a. ICE Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Effort Duration 
According to CAIG’s ICE, the JCP projected a 48-month RDT&E. The base 
assumption for this duration was that the type of technology that was being integrated into the 
JCM missile was mature technology. According to the services, the technologies were 
nondevelopmental and consequently did not require longer development efforts. CAIG 
disagreed with this assumption, using a review of historical missile programs that 
incorporated multimode seeker technologies. In doing so, the CAIG estimate determined a 
developmental effort lasting 26 months longer than was required for the JCM program. This 
increase made the total time the JCM program would execute RDT&E increase to 74 months. 
The increase to 74 months is the primary driver for the 39% increase of budgeted dollars for 
RDT&E in the ICE (R. Mortlock, personal communication, November 14, 2019). 
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The CAIG also cautioned that the DOD had a very poor track record of developing 
dual-mode seeker technologies into missiles, let alone multimode. The data CAIG references 
portrays programs having trouble due to data processing of multiple seekers and the ability 
for the missile to track properly while operating two seekers simultaneously. Although the 
JCM was planned to have three seeker technologies, it would only actively operate two at a 
time, reducing some complexity (R. Mortlock, personal communication, 2019). Although the 
CAIG settled on 74 months for development effort duration, the final thought offered by the 
ICE was the JCM program could easily incur a 147-month development effort given the 
complexity of the JCM and its requirements (R. Mortlock, personal communication, 
November 14, 2019). 
b. ICE Procurement Costs 
While the JCP failed to articulate the T1s or the learning and production rates, CAIG’s 
ICE offered such information. According to the ICE, the main difference between the JCP 
and the ICE rests with the assumptions of these rates and how they were applied. According 
to the ICE, the T1 used for the CAIG CE is actually 16% lower than the T1 used in the JCP 
despite the overall increase the CAIG predicted for procurement costs. 
In order to compare the difference between the two estimates, the CAIG offered its 
method of application for the learning and production rates. The rate of learning applied by 
CAIG was 88% and a production rate effect of 90%. The CAIG developed these rates through 
regression analysis of 12 previous missile production programs. As the CAIG compared its 
rates to the JCP, it was determined that the JCP used T1s and cost progress curves for each 
component and subcomponent of production. In order to compare the two figures effectively, 
the ICE averaged the respective rates of the JCP to develop a 93% learning curve rate and an 
83% production rate effect. According to the ICE, the 83% production rate effect is an 
aggressive rate but not considered unprecedented (R. Mortlock, personal communication, 
November 14, 2019). 
To further contrast the CAIG and the JCP, the CAIG notes the procurement profile of 
the JCM program that is not typical for missile programs. According to the ICE, missile 
programs seek to achieve a “tooled rate” earlier in production, and then have quantities 
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reduced thereafter. Shown in Table 12, the missile procurement profile exhibits a continual 
increase in production amounts, allowing the production rate effect to continue its cost 
reductions throughout the program. 
Table 12. Procurement Quantities of JCM Missiles. Source: R. Mortlock 
(personal communication, November 14, 2019). 
 
 
The only other increase in procurement costs found by the ICE was the requirement 
to include global positioning on all missiles, for both USA and USN at a cost of $7,000 per 
missile. In total, the combination of T1s, which is 16% greater in the JCP, the learning rate of 
93%, and the highly aggressive 83% production rate effect, coupled with the missile 
procurement profile found in Table 12 account for a 40% swing in costs between the two CEs 
(R. Mortlock, personal communication, November 14, 2019). 
c. ICE JCM Program Risks 
CAIG’s ICE of the JCM program also summarized how the developmental efforts and 
production rates may affect the JCM program in the future. For RDT&E, the CAIG discussed 
the impacts of the increase of development efforts against the current LRIP and secondary 
LRIP. Concern is also echoed that despite the program’s use of S&M, the fact that the JCM 
has yet to fly a prototype at MS B is of concern. The plan to conduct developmental testing 
(DT) while advance procurement of LRIP missiles is being executed could greatly impact 
costs if production needs to be suspended while technical complications are remedied. 
While the ICE did not outright object to the learning and production rates applied to 
the JCM program, it did provide context for how those rates could greatly impact affordability 
as future constraints arise. Beyond the challenges the program may face with procurement 
and its applied rates, the challenge becomes affordability if quantities of JCM are further 
reduced. The USA reduced its acquisition of JCM by virtually half to make the program 
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affordable. If further reductions of quantities occur, the average procurement unit cost and 
program acquisition unit cost will increase dramatically. 
3. DAB Summary 






Figure 17. JCM DAB Slides for Analysis. Source: R. Mortlock (personal communication, January 9, 2020). 
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D. INSTRUCTOR’S MANUAL
Developing a case study is a cyclical process that is guided by many tools, and how
those tools interact with the audience is critical in the improvement of learning outcomes 
and the case study itself. This project was developed with this in mind and therefore 
provides recommended teaching strategies, focusing on techniques and learning objectives. 
There are two methods of execution, and both vary given the complexity the instructor 
desires.  
1. Teaching Methodology and Format
According to Starostka and Kurzyk (2017), both the format and method of case 
study are critical to achieving a meaningful case study execution. This case study was 
designed to be taught in just one three-hour iteration but can easily be adapted for a more 
in-depth review of cost estimates within the acquisition environment if desired. For those 
reasons, there are two different methods of recommended application, but both attempt to 
achieve the same learning objectives. The first is the most common method, the Harvard 
case method, and the second is the McAleer Interactive Case Analysis (MICA). Regardless 
of the methodology used to execute the case study, understanding the multiple CEs 
associated with the JCM program cannot be done in one three-hour sitting. Because of this, 
students are issued the instructions for the case study and the associated reading materials 
prior to the formal case study class. In addition, the discussion questions are divided into 
two parts. The first set of questions is intended to be distributed with the case study 
materials in advance. The second set of questions will be proctored by the instructor as he 
or she sees fit, in an attempt to guide students through all learning objectives while in the 
classroom environment (Starostka & Kurzyk, 2017). 
a. Harvard Case Study Method of Execution
The first of the two possible methods of instruction for the JCM case study is the 
Harvard method. According to Starostka and Kurzyk (2017), the use of the Harvard method 
requires the instructor to be well-versed in the subject material and able to navigate the 
difficult dilemmas that may arise between students during their discussion of the questions 
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which they answered prior to arriving in class. Additionally, student participation is also a 
limitation to this method, as the instructor must maintain student dialogue, keep focus, and 
prevent students from lack of preparation. This also may subject the professor to taking too 
active of a role in the discussion, rather than letting the discussions be largely executed by 
the students themselves (Starostka & Kurzyk, 2017). 
b. McAleer Interactive Case Analysis (MICA) Method of Execution
Starostka and Kurzyk (2017) describe the MICA method as one that emphasizes 
written documentation and student roles, which differs from the Harvard method. The two 
primary reasons for using the MICA method are to attempt to eliminate the need for a 
highly skilled instructor (or one that is not comfortable with the material), to strengthen 
student interaction by requiring students to submit answers to questions ahead of time. A 
third advantage of this method is that it includes specific criteria for evaluation. (Desiraju 
& Gopinath, 2001). 
For this method, the instructor provides all the discussion questions in advance and 
requires submission of the discussion questions electronically in order to collect answers 
prior to the formal case study. From there, the class affords roughly a third of the students 
to volunteer as the administrative team. These members collect the answers to the 
discussion questions and primarily focus on the “action steps” or recommendations 
students submit. The administrative team then prioritizes each recommendation, grouping 
them if similar, to then drive discussion in the formal portion of the class. 
During the formal discussions, the students are called on to present their argument 
for why they arrived at a given recommendation, while the instructor can serve in a passive 
role and focus on grading student participation. One key reason the administrative team 
seeks to allow students to defend their recommendations is to ensure equal opportunity to 
participate. In the Harvard case method, it is possible that only a few students drive the 
discussions, while the MICA seeks to eliminate that (Desiraju & Gopinath, 2001). 
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2. JCM Case Study Learning Objectives 
The following learning objectives were generated based on the outline discussed in 
Figure 12. These objectives attempt to ensure that students gain knowledge, 
comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and an evaluation as it relates to the 
impacts of cost estimates on decision-making. 
• Demonstrated understanding of what cost estimates are; how they are 
applied in acquisitions; what the main methods of cost estimating are; and 
how to read cost estimates and understand the figures associated with each 
• Shows understanding of where and how improvement curve and 
production rates can be applied properly 
• Given proper data, T1s can be engineered to inform decisions 
• Recommendations for decision-making are defensible based on ability to 
translate cost estimate data into risk assumptions and mitigations 
According to Starostka and Kurzyk (2017), the format of the case study is vital to 
achieving the learning objectives. For this case study, it begins as an “iceberg” case, as 
students must use minimal knowledge of the program and cost estimating to answer the 
first set of discussion questions. This limited structure doesn’t require students to make 
decisions but asks them to gather necessary information that may lead to a recommendation 
(Starostka & Kurzyk, 2017). 
When formal classroom instruction begins, students have completed a fact-finding 
exercise of the JCM program and analyzed its associated cost estimates. Depending on the 
method of instruction, some or all of the discussion questions have been answered prior to 
convening. From there, the case study develops into an “illustrative” case where students 
deliberate over discussion questions in the classroom depending on the method chosen by 
the instructor. By the end of the case study, using proper teaching methods and formats, 
the learning objectives will be met. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This project was intended to develop my personal and professional understanding 
of the impacts of cost estimates, their assumptions, applications, and methods as I enter the 
acquisition workforce. Utilizing the JCM program, its various CEs, and their application 
within a PO gave me great insight to how programs rely on the figures they provide. The 
case study allows for participants to establish their own recommendation to the PM and the 
MDA if they were operating as an APM within JCM PO. Sharing these recommendations 
in a schoolhouse environment will certainly increase participants’ understanding of CEs 
and their underlying assumptions as they relate to the decisions they influence. I am excited 
to offer my recommendation as insight to my personal learning objectives that I achieved 
by producing this project. 
1. Author’s Findings 
Whether using either the ICE’s estimate of the JCM program or the JCP’s, the 
majority of the affordability concerns are within procurement for the JCM program. The 
major cost driver for procurement is recurring production. Using the JCP’s rough figures, 
the recurring production cost is nearly 65% of the total program cost. The learning and 
production rates applied to the estimates has extreme weight in determining if the JCM 
program is indeed affordable. Ensuring the right rates are applied to the program is critical 
in deciding about whether the JCM can continue as designed. 
As important as the cost estimates are to answering the affordability questions for 
any program, the two reports analyzed in this project seem to be disconnected and difficult 
to determine what information for which estimate is accurate and supportable as a senior 
decision-maker. After carefully researching and applying the proper mathematical 
formulas for learning and production rates, the ICE’s cautionary concerns regarding the 
length of EMD are immediately concerning to program affordability but not something the 
program cannot overcome. From there, it is difficult to support the ICE’s comparison of 
production and procurement costs due to the number of inaccurate figures published. 
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With the JCP however, there is a lack of data in the lengthy report. Critical to 
understanding the CE needed to include the learning and production rates due to their 
profound effect on the overall program cost. Without these figures, it somewhat hides the 
concern the program has as about affordability given the aggressive production rate and 
the procurement profile recommended. Those factors, coupled with the shortest possible 
EMD duration demonstrate that the program is already exceeding its costs and aggressive 
timelines and factors must be used in order to proceed with the JCM as originally designed. 
2. Author’s Recommendation to JCM PM 
The JCM program is a high visibility program due to its JCIDS participation and 
the ACAT ID designation. The program’s incorporation of international partnerships 
compounds the pressure the PO has to ensure the program’s success. Despite the early 
achievement of using S&M as part of the ongoing contracts PEO TM used to jumpstart the 
JCM program, my first recommendation is to increase the duration of RDT&E found in 
the ICE to the maximum extent possible. The reason for this is due to the CAIG’s use of 
historical data, which references multi-seeker complications on missile platforms. Ignoring 
these planning horizons is a critical failure of the program. Furthermore, assess the time it 
will take to produce the first prototype. Understanding the prototype project and its 
associated schedule and cost will allow the PM to determine which path of RDT&E is more 
accurate between the JCP and the ICE. This will also influence the time to DT and when 
advance procurement of Increment 1 LRIP can begin. 
As previously, the ability for the program to develop a prototype does more than 
just influence schedule. Prototyping also allows for the cost estimator to perform the “step-
down” function to help predict the T1 cost rather than use the methods found in the JCP or 
ICE (Richey et al., 2009). This then influences the largest portion of the JCM budget, 
procurement. With more accurate figures, the JCM program can better estimate future 
affordability. While using the T1 from the ICE and then applying it to the rates used in the 
JCP may show a substantial reduction in cost, it is more appropriate to use actuals as the 
program progresses. Additionally, the methodology to increase unit production throughout 
the life of the program is contingent on the ability of the contractor to increase the 
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production rate every lot. As shown in Table 8, the program applied a production rate effect 
due to the increase in production amounts. Rate and quantity are not synonymous. This 
assumes that the contractor will increase the rate at which it produces JCM in order to 
achieve the rate effect of 83% for each production lot. 
Depending on how well received the first two recommendations for the JCM 
program are, I would close with a final recommendation to the PM that more cost elements 
found within the JCP should assume the parametric method to improve its cost position 
rather than rely so heavily on analogy and assumptions of JCM program.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Cost Estimates and Their Assumptions 
Because I am a future APM and hopefully PM within the acquisition environment, 
I appreciate that the use of CEs provides insight into the affordability of a program. The 
challenge, however, is to accurately align assumptions with best practice and the 
information present within the program’s environment. For JCM, the PO firmly believed 
that the independent technologies were mature enough to be integrated into one system 
with minimal issue. They recommended the 48-month RDT&E at the DAB for MDA 
approval despite historic data. The PO also supported certain methods within the JCP that 
could have been improved upon. There are a number of instances where the parametric 
method would improve the JCP. Knowing the difference between the methods can help 
POs better understand the figures present in the CEs produced. 
I have yet to work within an acquisition program, but the disregard of historical 
data to promote a supported timeline to budgeted dollars is concerning. When evaluating 
the CEs against budgeted dollars, I found it odd that both found ways to be “affordable” 
despite the JCM’s shortcomings. I believe programs are required to offer hard truths early. 
If the program is determined by senior officials to be required despite the increase or 
decrease in capability or cost, the programs will continue. Failing to articulate a program’s 
current position is negligent. I also believe it is the culture of the DOD to attempt to make 
the program work in order to “accomplish the mission.” Somewhere in the middle of these 
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two paradigms rests the JCM program, along with countless other programs that end before 
their materiel solution is delivered to the warfighter. 
2. Writing and Executing Case Study 
According to Newman et al. (2019), the application of case study to teach higher 
education spans a diverse array of professions ranging from chemistry and automated 
record-keeping to organizational behavior, marketing, and management. It is most notably 
used in higher education institutions within fields that self-regulate or are the regulators. 
As an organization that forces development and key requirements to hold positions within 
the career field, there is ample reasoning for acquisition professionals to immerse 
themselves in the case study teaching methodology (Newman et al., 2019). 
From what I have learned in developing this project, there is tremendous flexibility 
to develop case study as instructors see fit in order to better the force. However, for this 
project, I found that the MICA method may be a more effective way to achieve the 
objective results that DAU-type courses might require. Table 13 shows comparisons for a 
number of metrics evaluated between the Harvard method and the MICA method. 
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Table 13. MICA Versus Harvard Case Method Comparison. Source: 
Desiraju and Gopinath (2001). 
 
 
Although the JCM program no longer exists today, the Joint-Air-to-Ground-Missile 
(JAGM) program does, according to the annual weapon systems assessment conducted by 
GAO. In the JAGM capacity, the program has adopted the requirement to replace the 
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Hellfire and longbow missiles, but with different technology capabilities than the JCM. 
Although the JCM was terminated, it has been essentially renamed to the JAGM and its 
requirement gap remains similar, but with a smaller technology package. The report finds 
that the missile seeker technology was finally matured in 2016, basically 14 years 
following the MDA’s decision to launch the JCM into TMRR and later EMD. The 
technology in the JAGM is reduced compared to the JCM, but a materiel solution for a 
capability gap, and resource necessitated program, is underway (GAO, 2019). It is amazing 
that the services have yet to produce a materiel solution to a capability gap identified over 
20 years ago, or maybe the JCM program demonstrates the difficulty programs have while 
operating within the acquisition frameworks, multiple wars, continuing resolutions, and 
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